its employment plan to sustain operational demand without breaking the AMD force.
The Army used the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model with 1:2 dwell time as means to sustain operational commitments. Combatant Commanders' immediate demand for THAAD and JLENS, as they come off the production lines and lack of a clear stationing plan, could lead to a repeat of the 90's challenges. This paper posits that a strategic stationing plan for THAAD and JLENS must be developed concurrent with acquisition of new air and missile defense capabilities. It recommends specific means to employ these new capabilities without adversely impacting the AMD force.
MISSILE DEFENSE STRATEGIC STATIONING
The protection of the United States from the threat of ballistic missile attack is a critical national security priority. The threat to our deployed forces and to our allies and partners is growing rapidly. This threat has significant implications for our ability to project power abroad, to prevent and deter future conflicts, and to prevail should deterrence fail. THAAD is designed to be a mobile AMD system. However due to its size and sensitivity of the critical components, namely the radar, for the purpose of this paper, THAAD is recognized as a movable system vice mobile. The impact is that THAAD will have a more stationary footprint when employed. Historically, the Army has shown that over time rotational forces have had a detrimental impact on AMD forces. Conversely, decisions to forward base units to achieve our national military strategy and alliance commitments have had numerous positive effects. As the Army begins to decide on employment / deployment options for THAAD and JLENS, it is important to assess the historic trends associated with contingency based, forward based, or rotational AMD forces.
Employment Courses of Action
The Army has three courses of action to employ these high demand/low density capabilities. Units can be permanently forward stationed in most likely threat regions, Ability to effective train forces to execute required employment tasks; Personnel:
Minimize negative impacts on personnel and families; Facilities: Required facilities to perform missions for sustained operations and minimize contingency costs; Risk: Ability to achieve COCOM mission requirements with minimal adverse impacts; Cost: Least amount of initial and sustained costs to accomplish missions; and Deterrence Effect:
Ability to persuade adversary not to destabilize region with ballistic missile attacks.
Forward Presence
Forward Presence is a significant aspect of our national security strategy. 17 The AMD forces deployed to Korea, Japan, and Europe are permanently forward stationed units as part of our global deterrence mission and provide assurance to our allies and From an operational readiness perspective, forward presence is ideal as the unit is already positioned to meet its wartime mission requirements per CCDR's CONPLAN/OPLANs. The units operate within their designated battlespace and are positioned to defend their assigned critical assets. The annual cost to maintain each battalion is roughly $14 million to cover operations & maintenance. 20 There are additional costs to the Army for basing these forces to pay for building and land leases, utilities, and host-nation support. These annual costs range from $2M in Germany to $3-4M in Japan and South Korea. 21 THAAD, forward stationed in Eastern Europe, Korea, or Japan, would provide immediate protection against SRBMs and MRBMs and enable flexibility for Combatant Commanders to reposition AMD forces elsewhere within his Area of Responsibility (AOR).
THAAD and JLENS deployed forward permanently places these critical systems at some risk to sabotage and strike if not well protected. Permanent stationing would require significant force protection of these systems from ground and air strikes in order for the AMD systems to be useful in times of crisis. The Army would incur additional costs to protect these assets with either ground forces or to contract private security.
Finally, there is the aspect of the deterrent value forward stationing provides.
The deployment of THAAD and JLENS into PACOM or CENTCOM would send a definitive message to Iran, North Korea, and China, that the U.S. is fully prepared to defend its interests and willing to commit critical capability early to prevent our adversaries from seeking an advantage. The deployment of PATRIOT to our current hotspots along with growing host nation AMD capacity clearly demonstrates U.S. and partner nation resolve to counter ballistic missiles threat within the region. The Army would need to build a training area, most likely at the deployed location, for THAAD and JLENS to train during their deployment. The crews will be required to maintain training proficiency, especially when deployed, so as to readily meet a threat.
Costs estimates for establishing a rotational site are estimated at $3-7M for each site.
Multiple this factor by 3-4 sites and the Army has a significant cost requirement for a sustained commitment, along with annual consumption and rotational costs.
Rotations always have a negative impact on personnel, particularly in retention.
If THAAD or JLENS were to move to a 1:1 dwell time rotation to meet current CCDRs' demand, this would have severe consequences for retention of critical military occupational specialties (MOSs). One of the key challenges of the 1990s PATRIOT rotations to SWA was the constant deployments. Often personnel and equipment from a returning unit would be reassigned to a deploying unit to fill shortages, further acerbating retention issues. 23 THAAD and JLENS utilize highly specialized MOSs that require extensive training and to lose personnel due to constant rotations would certainly impact the Army's ability to meet sustained operational readiness.
A clear advantage for rotational forces comes in the operational readiness realm.
Barring rotating equipment to and from CONUS and using the current ARFORGEN model of falling in on prepositioned equipment, rotational units have the advantage of having their equipment ready for immediate employment. Rotating THAAD and JLENS personnel can train on home station equipment and then conduct battle handover (right seat rides) once in theater with the outgoing unit on emplaced systems. Over time, the equipment will require a rotation as well, to refit and update critical system components, but that can be coordinated and planned well in advance.
From a costs perspective, the Army would incur many of the initial startup costs for new operational facilities in Eastern Europe and the Middle East for THAAD and JLENS as stated in the forward presence COA above. Additionally, the Army incurs further operational costs due to personnel rotations on an annual basis.
As with any rotating force, risk is incurred early in a rotation especially during transition. THAAD and JLENS are highly technical systems that require crews ready to conduct operations immediately. The new unit is learning the operational environment and new battle rhythm to ensure proper readiness. Towards the end of a rotation, units tend to be more complacent as they prepare for departure and eagerly conduct handover to their replacements. Our adversaries will have visibility on rotating forces and could seek an advantage during transition.
The commitment of THAAD and JLENS on a rotational basis sends a similar message to our adversaries about our resolve. Rotational deployment of THAAD and JLENS demonstrates to our adversaries and allies alike that the U.S. remains committed to stability in both CENTCOM and PACOM AORs. Similar deterrent value for forward presence units is applicable to rotating THAAD and JLENS annually.
Contingency
Contingency based forces remain in CONUS and deploy in support of a CCDR's request for forces in support of a crisis or as part of a CONPLAN/OPLAN. These are temporary deployments after which the forces return to CONUS. Like rotational forces, contingency based forces have many of the same advantages and disadvantages when it comes to training, personnel retention, and operational readiness. However, there are a couple of disadvantages that must be considered.
The most significant disadvantage with contingency-based forces is the cost associated with deploying a unit to deter an adversary or support a CCDR's exercise.
To deploy a THAAD battery in response to crisis costs millions of dollars for the transportation, contractor support, personnel deployment, etc. It took 15 C-17 sorties to deploy a THAAD battery (-) in support of EUCOM's JUNIPER COBRA exercise in Fall, 2010 at a rough cost of $14 million. 24 Deployment costs will be the largest driver for a contingency based force. However, these costs are much less than forward based or rotational forces.
Additionally, the Army must review the United States Transportation Command's (USTRANSCOM) ability to rapidly generate heavy airlift sorties (C-5B Galaxy or C-17
Globemaster III) to deploy a contingency based force. Combatant Commander's requests for AMD forces usually respond to an immediate crisis or ballistic missile threat, therefore the Army must factor how best to deploy. Airlift is the normal mode of rapid response. The USAF maintains a fleet of 205 x C-17s and 112 x C-5B/Ms; however as new C-17s are produced, the USAF plans to retire C-5s. Air Mobility
Command, subordinate command to USTRANSCOM, maintains the heavy airlift force and has global commitments to move men and materiel. In the event of a crisis, the Army and the requesting CCDR would need to justify reprioritizing heavy airlift to move minimum engagement packages (MEPs) into theater. This delays the deployment of other high priority assets to meet theater requirements. There is sufficient heavy airlift to meet a contingency based force deployment requirement; however these are very expensive deployment options. If time allows, the Army could offset costs by using
Military Sealift Command ships to deploy complete battery packages to respond to crisis. The long transit times for sea movement may make this an untenable option for CCDRs.
Like rotational forces, retaining THAAD and JLENS within CONUS may demonstrate to our allies a lack of commitment and strength our adversaries' resolve to challenge the U.S. regionally. Knowing that it would take time to deploy a contingency based force to meet a crisis, Iran, North Korea, Syria, or China may seek opportunities to broaden their relationships with our regional partners if the U.S. creates a void due to lack of presence. It would be imperative for the U.S. to exercise with our regional allies with contingency based forces on a routine basis much as the U.S. did with REFORGER exercises in the 1970s and 80s, to demonstrate our ability to respond to crisis and commitment to regional defense.
Analysis Summary
Based on the above analysis in a simple quantitative format (See Figure 4) , contingency based forces may be the best option to station and deploy new air and missile defense capabilities. CONUS based forces allow the Army to train THAAD and JLENS units to meet all operational training requirements prior to a deployment. This ensures that these units are ready to respond and deploy to meet theater crises. More importantly it provides policy makers multiple options to respond to crisis or meet CCDRs' security cooperation requirements. Considering how close contingency based and forward presence courses of action are in the analysis, the Army may consider a combined approach as more capability is developed over time. However, I think the future will feature more forces returning to CONUS to save money and become a contingency based force. Each base has the requisite force projection platforms to rapidly deploy THAAD and JLENS to meet regional crisis. Retaining these forces in CONUS enables sustained training to include live fire to meet all training requirements. Sustainment training is enhanced by having maneuver space to deploy and train locally. There is risk to contingency based forces assigned to CONUS. The volatility within a region could spark a ballistic missile attack with little warning or defensive preparation. By not maintaining forward BMD presence, our deployed U.S. forces are at greater risk to surprise attack. It may also send the wrong message to our partners and allies on our commitment to their defense. Building and maintaining strategic relationships is a cornerstone of our National Military Strategy and deployment of AMD forces to the region sends a clear message.
There are a couple alternatives the Army should consider. The Army could use a mix of stationing options over time. It is possible to start with contingency based forces from CONUS ready to respond to crisis. If a crisis occurs, the Army could use rotational forces for a short time but again, due to low density, this is not a tenable option for sustained commitment. As fiscal resources become more available transition to permanent forward presence locations will enhance our security commitment abroad and assure our allies and partners. This has several advantages. First, it allows the development of partners' capabilities through integrated exercises. It preserves our most capable missile defense systems in the event of a crisis such as imminent threats in the Middle East or on the Korean peninsula. This option provides policy makers with options to build capacity and still provide a credible responsive force to deter aggression. As the U.S. fields additional systems, transitioning to forward based may be a preferred option to defend as far forward to maintain deterrence, prepared to defeat attacks by our adversaries.
The Army could establish -warm basing‖ development projects that build semipermanent facilities with electrical and communications requirements in place that a deploying AMD force could occupy in the event of a crisis. Warm basing provides a visible presence to our adversaries that we will respond to threats and reassure allies and partners that we will assist in their security when they feel threatened. This will add onto the Army's overall cost for these programs but provide a means to rapidly transition to meet a crisis without the exorbitant costs of forward basing AMD capabilities.
The United States can mitigate risk by partnering with regional states to build active defense capabilities, particularly THAAD, JLENS, and PATRIOT to enable our partners and allies to provide their own protection. The Joint Force will provide capabilities to deter aggression and assure our allies and partners through our nuclear arsenal and overseas missile defense capabilities. The NMS describes a key tenet of U.S missile defense policy as -we will continue to lead in advancing Ballistic Missile defense capabilities against limited attacks and we seek opportunities for cooperation with allies and partners in this area.‖ 27 This assists with risk mitigation in the near-term and enables U.S. strategic repositioning of AMD forces as allies are better able to defend themselves. The United States has made significant contributions to Japan, Kuwait, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates to strengthen their active defenses. Just recently, the U.S. agreed to sell $7 billion worth of AMD capabilities to UAE 28 and a $60B package of U.S equipment to Saudi Arabia. THAAD and JLENS provides another layered capability for regional partners to deter North Korea, Iran, and Syria.
In conclusion, the Army must strongly consider keeping new AMD forces CONUS-based and contingency ready. The positive impact on operational readiness, training, and personnel retention outweighs the disadvantages associated with a rotational or forward stationed force. The United States maintains preeminent air and missile defense capabilities and as a global power retains the means to rapidly respond to any crisis. Keeping AMD forces in CONUS provides policy makers options to deploy this unique capability anywhere on earth, ready to defend U.S. forces, our allies and partners, and critical assets against any aggressor nation's use of ballistic missiles and aerial platforms.
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